Internal and external security in post-Communist Eastern Europe: results of a 10-nation study

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Abstract

Security issues in East-Central Europe have received a high profile recently with the proposed entry of three post-Communist countries into NATO and discussion about further widening this alliance. The collapse of communism and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has brought new military alignments and potentialities. However, with the transformation of these countries into democratic societies, the views of the population also need to be taken into account. In this paper we report the results of a longitudinal, representative sample survey of ten post-Communist countries in East-Central Europe: Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia . The paper compares the results of questions about attitudes to internal and external security in 1992 and 1996 in each of these countries. In particular, we consider subjective perceptions of threat from neighbouring countries, from great powers such as Russia, Germany and the USA, from national minorities and ethnic groups and from immigrants and migrants. In this context we analyse their views on NATO membership. We compare these countries in general by constructing an index of perceptions of threat. The results imply that the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the Central European buffer zone feel far more insecurity than the countries of the former Soviet Union in our sample, and these are also the countries which would most like to join NATO.

Zusammenfassung

Fragen der Sicherheit haben in Mitteleuropa und Osteuropa in jüngster Zeit eine deutliche Aufmerksamkeitssteigerung dadurch erfahren, daß drei postkommunistische Länder für die Aufnahme in die NATO vorgeschlagen wurden und daß die Diskussion über die Osterweiterung der NATO stark an Tempo gewonnen hat. Der Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus einerseits und die Auflösung des Warschauer Paktes andererseits bewirkten neue militärische Bündnismöglichkeiten und Kooperationschancen im Sicherheitsbereich. Die Transformation dieser Länder in demokratische Gesellschaften brachte es aber auch unausweichlich mit sich, daß die Ansichten und Meinungen der Öffentlichkeit und der Bürger in stärkerem Maße Berücksichtigung finden. In diesem Artikel berichten wir über die Hauptergebnisse einer repräsentativen und longitudinalen Umfragestudie in zehn postkommunistischen Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas: Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Slowenien, Kroatien, Polen, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Ukraine und Belarus. Diese Studie vergleicht die Einstellungen der Bevölkerungen dieser Region in Hinblick auf die innere und äußere Sicherheit in diesen 10 Staaten in der Periode zwischen 1992 und 1996. Insbesondere untersuchten wir die subjektiven Wahrnehmungen und Einschätzungen einer Bedrohung seitens der Nachbarstaaten, seitens Großmächten wie der Russischen Föderation, Deutschland und der USA, seitens nationaler Minderheiten und ethnischer Gruppen sowie ausgehend von Migranten und Immigranten. In diesem Zusammenhang analysieren wir die Einstellungen der Bürgerinnen und

Bürger dieser Staaten zur Mitgliedschaft des eigenen Landes zur NATO. Wir vergleichen diese Länder auch in einer allgemeinen Weise durch die Verwendung eines BEDROHUNGS-INDEX, der in einer einzelnen Maßzahl das subjektive Bedrohungsbild einer nationalen Bevölkerung erstmals quantifiziert. Die Ergebnisse unserer Studie lassen den Schluß zu, daß die Länder des Gebiets des früheren Jugoslawien einerseits und der mitteleuropäischen Pufferzone andererseits das höchste Niveau an subjektiven Bedrohungsbildern aufweisen. Zugleich sind dies jene Länder, die am stärksten in die NATO als Militärbündnis im Neuen Europa drängen.

Keywords
Security, Central Europe, Post-Communism, NATO

Schlagworte
Sicherheit, Mitteleuropa, Post-Kommunismus, NATO

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Contents

The ending of the Cold War following the extraordinary political events in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s served to re-shape the political and military map of Europe. In the words of George Bush it augured a 'New World Order'. Previously the Iron Curtain had divided Europe in to two halves, East and West, Communist and Capitalist, NATO and Warsaw Pact. The break up of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into different states dissolved this neat divide set up after the Second World War. For the countries of Central Europe, traditionally a military 'Buffer Zone' between East and West it required some re-thinking of external security issues - who was now an enemy and who was a friend? This was a much a question for traditionally militarily neutral Austria as for the newly emerging democracies of Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. For those countries who had previously formed part of the Soviet Union but were now for the first time fully independent these issues also arose. However, the opening of borders and the opening of societies also threw up new internal security issues as states began to fissure and re-align, populations began to move once more around the region and ethnic minorities found new voices with which to put forward their claims.

Since the initial transformation period things have moved on rapidly. Several elections have confirmed the position of democratically elected governments in Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics and these countries also have special associate membership status of the EU and some of them are scheduled to become members after 2000. The privatisation policies and successful economic transformation are making these countries increasingly 'normal' parts of western Europe. However, war in the former Yugoslavia sent those countries in a different direction, even diverging from one another, with relatively prosperous Slovenia looks more like one of the Visegrad countries mentioned above and is expected to join the European Union in the not too distant future. The break up of Czechoslovakia in 1992 showed that there were also peaceful means of bringing about the fission of post-Communist countries. Romania and Bulgaria, have not gone the way of the former Yugoslavia, but also aspire to European Union recognition. Furthermore, they have been diverging from one another as Romania goes ahead with a rather radical privatisation and reform policy whilst Bulgaria is just staggering out of a major economic crisis. Finally, Belarus and Ukraine, have struggled to introduce political and economic reforms, so far not very successfully. In this process Ukraine has become more westward looking whilst Belarus more eastward looking in terms of strategic alliances.

Whilst the political and military elite planned new meetings and alliances, the introduction of democratically elected governments meant that more attention had to be paid to the attitudes and values of the population. What was their opinion? Who did they see as friends and enemies? The answers to these questions can be gained by looking at survey data making comparisons between countries and across time. Here we analyse New Democracies Barometer (NDB) data in the following countries: Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia. The survey of a representative sample of approximately 1000 respondents from each country has been

carried out each year since 1992. Out of these ten countries, nine have been members of the former military transnational organisation of the Warsaw Pact; only Romania was not part of that transnational military organisation of European Communism after the Second World War. Some of the new democracies were part of other states before 1989, but they all share the Warsaw Pact historical experience. The end of the Warsaw Pact left a military vacuum between Slovenia and Ukraine, which is now a much-debated topic in international politics.

Sources of insecurity

a. Neighbouring countries

What are the sources of threat for Central European post-Communist peoples? Historically this region has been a buffer zone between different Empires: French, German, Austrian, Russian/Soviet and Turkish Empires all came and went fighting different battles and imposing different kinds of rule. Borders and boundaries were changed many times, countries were created, countries were destroyed or countries were simply moved to a different place. The population comprises a complex patchwork of different ethnic groups, speaking many different languages, many of which have been very persistent over time despite the comings and goings of various rulers. With the nationalistic movements arising during the nineteenth century, many of the people's of Central Europe were able to codify and further establish their literary and cultural heritage and claim their own nationhood with geographical borders (Gellner 1983). But given the history of the region, these borders were always disputed. The recognition of the existing borders therefore (however arbitrarily drawn) was one of the first key security issues of the post-1989 settlement. This has been an issue in every post-Communist central European country where neighbours can make historically justified claims upon territory - in other words, all of them. Neighbouring countries therefore pose a potential threat to the security of post-Communist states which are no longer protected by grand strategic alliances.

b. Great powers

The two most bruising experiences of invasion by different empires in recent memory was that of Germany from the West and Russia or the Soviet Union from the East. Central Europeans have very vivid memories of the brutal invasion of Germany during the 1930s and the massive destruction of people and homes which took place as a result. Fear of threat from Germany is therefore still a very lively issue. Central Europeans have equally bitter memories of their subsequent 'liberation' by the Soviet troops from the East who did not leave again for another 45 years. Countries which had been allies of Germany were punished and although this regime was not as bloodthirsty in most countries as had been the previous occupation by Germans, the political and economic straightjacket imposed by Communist systems and the appropriation of property and political freedoms was bitterly resented, leading to a string of uprisings in these countries over the post-Second World War period. A

very tangible evidence of the Soviet presence was provided by the presence of large numbers of troops and military manoeuvres to protect the Western Frontier of the Soviet Empire. These troops were also used to suppress internal uprisings such as that in 1968 in the Czech Republic and in 1956 in Hungary and in 1953 inEastern Germany. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has curbed the threats originating from the East helped to ensure the independence of the Central European countries, but the political uncertainty and instability in Russia means that it is still potentially a threat for these small recreated nations. Although Russians themselves may be unwilling to re-create the military ambitions of the former Soviet Union (see Rose 1997) demagogic politicians such as Zirinovksy have the power to stir up popular feelings.

Although Germany and Russia are the two most immediate great powers to threaten Central European countries, the other great power which has been part of the global division of Communism and Capitalism is the USA. The USA also stationed troops across the border in Western Europe, undertook military manoeuvres and trained its missiles on Central and Eastern European cities. The collapse of the Soviet Empire is often seen as a victory for the Americans. America exerts a considerable influence in Central Europe through business investment, the cultural dominance of consumer culture and Hollywood movies and through sending in various experts to help transform the political and economic systems of Central Europe. The US, traditionally portrayed as the enemy of Communism, might still be perceived as a threat in Central European countries.

c. National minorities and ethnic groups

Despite the various forms of deportation or destruction of ethnic populations ,which have taken place over the last seventy years, each country contains ethnic populations and minorities from other countries as well as its own (Gellner 1994). For each country, the national minorities belonging to the neighbouring country can be used to de-stabilise rather fragile regimes, as was done when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938 to 'save' the ethnic Germans who were living there and was done by both Serbia and Croatia in the recent war in Yugoslavia. These national minorities can therefore be seen as a kind of 'fifth column' inside the country. There is also a particular problem with what Gellner (1995) termed 'dominant minorities'; that is, the minority populations which had previously been dominant ethnic groups but which the receding tide of empire had left behind. These dominant minorities often regard themselves as superior to the other people in the countries in which they live and are not very inclined to accept a lesser minority status. Examples of these are Russians in the Baltic States or Ukraine and Hungarians in Romania or Serbs and Croats in Bosnia.

The post-Cold War period has seen the eruption of various ethnic conflicts in the region and for the first time, the persecution of minorities such as gypsies and Muslims (which was always widespread) has become more publicised (Transitions 1997). Furthermore, ethnic

minorities are seeking to find their own voice within the newly constructed states and this is often resisted by political leaders. In some cases these ethnic minorities are well established and form highly articulate lobbies for use of their own language, their own education, their own representation in the political system, as is the case of the Hungarians in Romania. However, new ethnic groups have been discovered or re-discovered as part of the liberalisation process and perhaps as a consequence of global tendencies towards multi-culturalism. Examples in the Central European Region would be the German minority in Poland, believed not to exist only eight years ago, but which have now formed their own political party. Other examples are the Ruthenians in trans-Carpathia whose cause has been espoused by a small number of local intellectuals and a non-local Canadian academic (Hann 1995). There is a potent dynamic which involves the co-variance of nationalising groups, minorities living in other countries and newly emergent countries (Rogers Brubaker 1996). For these reasons, minorities can be a threat to the internal security of the country.

d. Escalating migration

In the past, movement around the countries of Central Europe was very restricted, even for their own citizens and even more restricted for outsiders. The Iron Curtain sealed off these countries from East-West movements. However, the dismantling of the Iron Curtain has resulted in new population flows and new forms of mobility. The traditional flow of movement has been from East to West and this continues with Central Europeans working, studying and visiting European Union countries either legally or illegally (Fassmann and Münz 1994). Citizens from the countries bordering the European Union can cross the 'green line' without much restriction in any case. Tourists and shoppers travel in large numbers across the borders from West to East. However, the opening of borders also liberalised movement around the Central European region as large numbers of Russians and Ukrainians or people from even further afield arrive to work, to shop or to trade in the more prosperous countries of post-Communist Central Europe. Increasing discrepancies in the economic fortunes of the different post-Communist countries encourages this flow of people (Wallace et al. 1996, 1998). The main recipients of these new flows of people from the East have been the Central European countries of Poland, Hungary Czech and Slovak Republics. In addition to people coming to work or trade, these countries started to become transit countries for migrants from outside the region trying to get into Western Europe - from China, from Pakistan and from Africa, for example. Tens of thousands were turned back from the border to were sent back to the last country which they entered - mostly the post-Communist countries of Central Europe. These became transit countries not just for illegal migrants but also for criminal networks in arms, drugs, prostitution and stolen art dealing. The European Union, keen to keep its borders safe and stable has been active in helping to deal with these problems, involving increasing co-operation and intervention in the counties of Central Europe. In economic terms and in terms of migration these countries form a new kind of 'buffer zone' between East and West.

For many business men from further East, it is more convenient to set up operations in the cheaper but also less institutionalised and more corruption-prone post-Communist countries than to go directly into Western Europe and these Central European countries have therefore become communications points in this respect (Wallace et al. 1996). Many Western companies and western investors have also started to move into Central Europe, bringing their own strata of professional employees with them. Western European and US shops, banks and businesses have become increasingly common.

For people in Central European countries the increase in migration has coincided with an increase in crime and these two things are linked in the minds of many people. Furthermore, a wave of asylum seekers and refugees (not always officially declaring themselves as such) hit the Visegrad countries after the war broke out in Yugoslavia and after European Union countries started closing their doors to these refugees in 1992.

The Central European post-Communist countries have therefore experienced an influx of migrations and temporary mobility, unknown for some fifty years. This can also be seen as source of threat and insecurity even though the numbers are relatively and absolutely small compared to many Western European countries. The more affluent countries of the 'Buffer Zone' - Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics - have been the main targets of this migration both because of their borders with the European Union and because of their relative affluence and political stability compared with other countries to the East and South.

Who are friends and who are enemies?

The change described above have left the countries of Post-Communist Central Europe with the need to re-think their alliances. Their relatively weak position in political, economic and military terms means that they are vulnerable to many influences. They are mostly relatively small countries with unstable borders which enhances this vulnerability. The strengthening and deepening of ties within the European Union creates a strong block on the Western side although the military Union has not been pursued, despite some discussions. The European Union represents a strong economic pole of attraction into whose orbit the countries of Central Europe are drawn whether they like it or not (Wallace et al. 1997). Many of them aspire to join the European Union, although negotiations are underway to admit only five candidates: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia..

The continuing military strength of Russia to the East is illustrated by its intervention in Chechenya, Moldova and the Caucasus as well as sabre rattling over the Black Sea fleet. To the west, NATO continues to be a strong military global force. The countries of Central Europe are caught in the middle with little military clout. Not surprisingly, many post-Communist Central European countries also aspire to joining NATO, although only three - Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary - are being admitted (depending upon the results of further negotiations and a referendum in Hungary).

Other strategic alliances have been proposed or constructed but do not seem to carry the same political, economic or military weight: CEFTA(Central European Free Trade Area) CEI (Central European Initiative), CSCE (Council for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the Baltic Council and the Council of Europe are all examples (Cowen Karp 1993).

For this reason it is important to look at who the people of Central Europe regard as their friends and enemies in the new reordering of Europe. This forms the next part of the paper.

1. Perceptions of threat

One crucial question of the future stability or instability of the historically shattered European region is the form and the speed of integration into different forms of military co-operation. The question of military integration is closely linked with the different perceptions of threat in the 10 post-Communist countries, which are the territorial focus of the analysis. The New Democracies Barometer asked in 1992 (=NDB II) and in 1996 (=NDB IV), which countries or other actors pose a threat to the country of the respondent. The results for the average of all 10 countries show a rather clear picture (see Table 1):

Table 1:
"Do you think any of these factors poses a threat or no threat to peace and security in this society?"

Subjective Threat 1992-6



The greatest threat from a mass public perspective for the post-Communist countries between Zagreb and Kiev appears to be Russia. The percentage of Eastern Europeans, who regard Russia as a threat to their homeland, went up from 29 per cent in 1992 to 39 per cent

in 1996. On the other hand, 61 per cent of all Eastern European respondents think that Russia poses no threat to their country. The second international danger for those former countries of the demised Warsaw Pact are the neighbouring countries. In 1992, 49 per cent of all post-Communist citizens were afraid of some of their neighbours, this proportion went down in the following 6 years to 28 per cent in 1996. One can assume that roughly one third of Eastern Europeans are afraid of some neighbouring states although the subjective threat by one's neighbours decreased from one half to one third over time. In 1996, 72 per cent of post-Communist citizens believe that their neighbours form no military threat to them any more. This may be because most of the borders between and around post-Communist countries have now been confirmed through international treaties, thus reducing the possibility of dispute over territory. However a number of disputed borders and territories in the region also remain unresolved.

The third strongest danger for this part of the world are minorities and ethnic groups within the country. In 1992, 40 per cent of all East Europeans felt threatened by minorities and ethnic groups inside their own country, but that number fell to 25 per cent in 1996. As with neighbouring states, the fear of instability caused by ethnic groups within the country cooled down in the first half of the 90's considerably. In 1996, 75 per cent of all post-Communist citizens expressed no anxieties about ethnic groups or minorities threatening the internal peace and stability of their own country. A similar longitudinal pattern appears with regard to threat from immigrants and refugees. In 1992, 36 per cent of all East Europeans were quite nervous about migrants 'flooding' their country and producing thus political and social instability, but that share went down to 22 per cent in 1996, which is still quite high, but the trend is definitely downwards during the observed period.

The 'German threat' and the 'American threat' is much lower compared with the Russian Federation, the neighbour states, internal minorities or external migrants, but nevertheless we can speak of some individual or group anxiety about potential actions by Germany or the United States of America. One Fifth of all post-Communist citizens regard Germany as a threat to their country, a percentage which is constant over time. On the other hand, 80 per cent of all Eastern Europeans do not see any danger arising from Germany's ambitions towards the East. In 1992, only 8 per cent associated some danger with the USA, but that share increased to 15 per cent in 1996. Over time, more Eastern Europeans feel threatened by US foreign policy.

In an overview of the subjective perceptions of military threat one might argue that on the one hand, the fear of threat by 'great powers' Germany, America and especially Russia - had grown between 1992 and 1996. There could be a growing strategic cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe, at least in the mind of the post-Communist peoples in the region. On the other hand, the anxieties concerning destabilising effects caused by neighbouring countries, by internal minorities or external migrants lost their impact upon the ordinary citizens in Eastern Europe and are recently less pressing than in 1992.

This is in contrast to results reported for Russia, where it is internal minorities and other republics of the former USSR which is the main cause for anxiety (Rose 1997b).

Next we turn to more detailed analyses of who is afraid of Russia, Germany and America.

2. Who is afraid of Russia ?

The leading group with extremely high levels of military distrust about the Russian Federation and their future strategic intentions is Croatia and Poland. The feeling of being threatened by the Russian Federation is highest in Croatia (see Table 2). In 1992, 33 per cent of the Croatian population expressed some anxiety about the Russian Federation and their strategic intentions. That share increased tremendously over time and reached the level of 71 per cent of Croatians in 1996. One explanation for this steep increase could be the open support of the Russian Federation for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the war in Bosnia.

The other nation which also feels threatened by Russia, is Poland. The high level of Polish mistrust about the Russian military potential was constant over time with 66 per cent of the Polish population expressing fear about Russia in 1992, and 71 per cent of the Poles with the same feeling of Russian threat in 1996. Only one third of the Polish people do not feel threatened by their Eastern neighbour Russia.

The second group of post-Communist countries with high levels of military distrust about future Russian intentions are the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia. In 1992, 39 per cent of the Czech population felt threatened by Russia, a share, which increased quite considerably to 55 per cent in 1996. In Romania, 62 per cent of the Romanian respondents expressed some anxiety about perceived Russian military intentions in 1992. This Romanian fear of future Russian military activities decreased to 55 per cent in 1996, hence displaying now the same level of military distrust towards the Russian Federation like the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, the scepticism of the Slovakian mass public about future Russian military strategies grew considerably over time. In 1992, 26 per cent of the population felt threatened by Russia, a share, which increased up to 51 per cent in 1996. Therefore we cannot speak cannot speak of increasing friendship and closeness between Slovakia and the Russian Federation in security terms, at least not at the level of the ordinary citizens in Slovakia.

Romanians also feel threatened by Russia and this could be on account of the military interventions of the Soviet/Russian Fourteenth Army in 1992 in neighbouring transdenistren province of Moldova, which is ethnically similar to Romania and formerly a part of Romania. By 1996, hostilities there had ceased. It could also be a legacy of the anti-Russian stance of the Ceauceauscu regime.

Table 2:
"Do you think Russia poses a threat (=big threat + some threat) to peace and security in this society?"

Threat by Russia 1992-1996



In Hungary, the feeling of military threat by Russia grew over time too. In 1992, only 13 per cent of the Hungarians felt threatened by Russia. This changed in the first half of the 90's with the effect that 30 per cent of the Hungarian population is quite concerned about the 'Russian danger' in 1996. The extent of military distrust concerning Russia increased sharply in Slovenia. In 1992, only 3 per cent of the Slovenian population was afraid of the Russians, whereas more than one fifth of the Slovenes (21 per cent) felt threatened by Russia in 1996. As with Croatia, the high level of military distrust in Slovenia seems to be linked with the Russian military and political affiliation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in general and the Serbian nationality in particular.

However, it is also rather surprising that fear of Russia actually grew in most of the Central European countries, since they do not have direct borders with Russia (except in the case of Poland) and since the Soviet troops had all left by 1996. In the countries which have direct borders with Russia and towards which Russia was making various claims, there was much less fear of their traditionally dominating Eastern neighbour.

The situation in the post-Soviet countries such as Belarus and Ukraine is, as along many other attitudinal dimensions, quite different. In Ukraine, only 17 per cent of the Ukrainian population is nervous about the Russian military in 1996. A similar picture emerges in Belarus, where 15 per cent express some anxiety about future Russian military intentions. The level of a perceived Russian military threat in both former Soviet Republics is constant over time. Bulgaria is strikingly free of any feeling of threat from Russia: 5 per cent of the

Bulgarians feels threatened by Russia, whereas 95 per cent of the Bulgarian population show no military nervousness about the Russian Federation whatsoever. Like in many other fields of attitudes in post-Communist Europe, a high level of attitudinal homogeneity can be noticed between the post-Soviet countries Belarus and Ukraine on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other hand.

The analysis of different levels of trust and distrust concerning the military strategy of the Russian Federation in the future, showed that the countries which were in the process of joining the NATO in 1997 also have quite high levels of military distrust about Russian military intentions: Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The top position of Croatia in the anti-Russian league can be explained by the war situation in the territory of former Yugoslavia, in that respect, Croatia, Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are still 'societies in war' and cannot be compared with other post-Communist societies in transformation. In terms of the subjective feeling of threat by the mass population, Romania would also qualify as member of NATO, a view which was evidently shared by some European countries, but not by the USA. The military climate of the Slovakian population is in stark contrast to the images of pro-Russian feelings in Slovakia, which are presented frequently in the Western press, but are definitely wrong in that aspect of international integration.

With regard to perceptions of threat from Russia, there was therefore a division among the countries under consideration. Some feared Russia and their fear was growing, but these were the countries most far away from Russia. Other countries did not fear Russia and their fear was even declining - these were the countries closest geographically, linguistically and politically to Russia.

3. Who is afraid of Germany ?

The perceived threat by Germany is constant over time: one fifth of the Eastern European populations think that Germany is posing a threat to peace and security to their home country (20 per cent in 1996), however, different countries feared Germany at different periods.. The highest level of anti-German feelings in strategic terms is visible in two neighbouring states of Germany, in Poland and in the Czech Republic. In 1996, 45 per cent of the Polish population and 44 per cent of the Czech population felt subjectively threatened by Germany. Poland and the Czech Republic display the same level of anti-German feelings, but this is a result of divergent trends. In Poland we had a extremely high level of public distrust towards Germany in 1992, when 70 per cent of the Polish population expressed fears about potential military intentions on Germany. That enormous extent of anti-German feelings went down in the course of the first half of the 90's to 45 per cent, which is still considerable and not to be underestimated. Hence, we are entitled to speak of an erosion of anti-German feelings in Poland by 25 percentage points, but in the Czech Republic the trend is reverse. In 1992, 38 per cent of the Czech mass public distrusted Germany concerning her strategic intentions, a figure which went up to 44 per cent in 1996. Thus, we notice a rise of anti-German feelings

from a military-strategic point of view in the Czech Republic by 6 percentage points between the beginning and the middle of the 90's.

Table 3:
Perceived Treat by Germany:
"Do you think, Germany poses a threat or no threat to peace and security in this society?"

Threat by Germany 1992-1996



As in the Czech Republic, anti-German sentiments concerning the military dimension are rising in Slovakia too. In 1992, 21 per cent of the Slovakian population thought that Germany posed a threat to Slovakia, which increased to 32 per cent in 1996. Hence, we can argue that one third of Slovakian society has serious concerns about the 'German danger' in 1996. A similar pattern is visible in Croatia, but on a lower general level. In 1992, only 3 per cent of the Croatian population was afraid of Germany. This coincided with the strong German and Austrian diplomatic support for Croatian independence during that period, which was seen very favourably by the Croatian public. In 1996 however, the picture had changed considerably. At the later time we find 23 per cent of the Croatian sample expressing fears about the military potential of Germany, maybe in relation with the peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations in that region, which involved German combat troops for the first time ever since the end of World War II . There was a 20 percentage point rise in Croatian anti-German feelings, which is quite remarkable in comparison with other countries. The military threat of Germany is also more visible in Belarus, where 21 per cent feel a certain military threat arising from Germany in 1996.

In Romania, one can see 15 per cent of the population concerned about the German military power in 1996, which is constant over time. The perception of German military potential grew in Ukraine from 3 per cent in 1992 up to 12 per cent in 1996, whereas the Hungarians display

no clear fear of German military power: only 5 per cent of the Hungarian population think that Germany poses a threat to Hungary, which is negligible. The same goes for Slovenia, where 5 per cent associate some danger with the German military potential. Finally, in Bulgaria we do not find any anti-German feelings from the military point of view at all.

In general, fewer people feared Germany than feared Russia, but this fear was growing among some countries. Some of those countries who most feared Russia also feared Germany; for them the neighbouring 'great powers' were a threat.

4. Who is afraid of America?

The perception of military threat exerted by the USA is the lowest of all security risks within Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the percentage of Eastern Europeans concerned about the military power of the United States of America grew from 8 per cent in 1992 to 15 per cent in 1996. As a consequence of the military events in the territory of former Yugoslavia in the first half of the nineties, Croatia displays the highest level of military distrust concerning the USA. In 1992, only 8 per cent of the Croatian population felt the USA being a threat to the Croatian state, whereas we find 29 per cent of the adult Croatian population in 1996 are anxious about the American military power and her possible effects upon Croatia and her geopolitical position. In Belarus, the anti-American feelings increased from 13 per cent in 1992 to 24 per cent in 1996. Recently, one fourth of the Belorussians think that the USA is a real danger for Belarus, a phenomenon which could be linked eventually with the close strategic alliance between the Russian Federation and Belarus in the last two years. In Slovakia, one could notice a considerable rise in anti-American feelings since the early 90's. In 1992, only 5 per cent of the Slovakian population felt threatened by the USA, that figure increased to 22 per cent in 1996. Now, more than one fifth of the Slovakian population is concerned about the American military potential and possible effects upon Slovakian security. This change in the Slovakian public mood could be an outcome of domestic Slovakian politics and the basic ideological orientations of the current political regime in Bratislava. In Ukraine we find a similar development as in Belarus, a very low level of anti-American sentiments at the beginning of the transformation process (4 per cent in 1992) and a steep increase of up to 16 per cent of Ukrainians nervous about American military power in 1996.

Table 4:
"Do you think, the USA poses a threat (=big threat +some threat) to peace and security in this society?"



In four of the countries under consideration, roughly one tenth of the population displays some fears about the military power of the USA. These are Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. The vast majority of people in those countries - around 90 per cent - are not afraid of America or American military potential. Nevertheless, one should note that the very low level of anti-American feelings in those four countries is growing steadily to higher levels, a trend which should be observed in the future. In Hungary and Slovenia, virtually nobody is afraid of the Americans.

Therefore, in most countries fear of the USA had also grown, although it remains at far lower levels than fear of either Russia or Germany.

5. Who is afraid of neighbouring countries?

The second biggest military threat after Russia comes from the respective neighbouring states. However, an important finding is that the immediate threat at the borders seems to be less strong and frightening than at the beginning of the 90's. (see. Table 5).

Table 5:
"Do you think, the neighbouring countries pose a threat (=big threat + some threat) to peace and security in this society?"

Threat by neighbouring countries: 1992-1996



Again, the situation in the territory of former Yugoslavia is very different and undoubtedly influenced by the armed conflicts following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The absolute majority of the Slovenes (60 per cent) and of the Croatians (55 per cent) are afraid of the Serbians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That subjective perception of a Serbian threat has decreased only slightly since 1992.

The country occupying third place amongst those most threatened by their neighbours is Hungary. In 1992, 64 per cent of the Hungarian population felt threatened by their neighbours. This Hungarian strategic 'complex' concerning her neighbours cooled down to 48 per cent in 1996. Nevertheless, we have to see that still have the Hungarian population is afraid of their neighbours. This could be an outcome of the proximity of Hungary to the armed conflicts taking place in the former Yugoslavia and the large number of refugees who fled across into Hungary. It is also the case that Hungarian ethnic minorities live over the border in most directions and this could give Hungarians a special sensitivity to the situation in their neighbouring countries. Most notably, there has been some tension between the Romanian government and the Hungarian minority who are living there and the same is the case for Slovakia.

A similar picture of strategic landscapes appears in Slovakia, which happens to be a neighbour of Hungary with a considerable Hungarian minority in Southern Slovakia. In 1992,

46 per cent of the Slovakian mass public felt threatened by their neighbours. That share of ordinary Slovakians nervous about potential military activities in the neighbourhood decreased to 36 per cent in 1996, which is still clearly more than one third of the adult Slovakian population. This mood of threat is exacerbated in Slovakia by domestic politicians and proposals, for example by Meciar, of a population exchange with Hungary of ethnic Hungarians and Slovaks.

In Romania, the general feeling of threat by the neighbouring states decreased during the 90's. In 1992, the enormous majority of 67 per cent of Romanians felt threatened by their neighbours, whereas this was only only 35 per cent in 1996. This change could be because of the military tensions in Moldova in the early 1990s which have since become more peaceful and the greater harmonisation of relations with Hungary. Despite this obvious growth in Romanian confidence, we can see that there are still more than one third of Romanian women and men, who felt some threat from neighbouring states.

We found also a high level of military distrust towards neighbouring states in Bulgaria. In 1992, 61 per cent of the Bulgarians expressed their doubts about the peaceful intentions of the neighbours, thus displaying a high degree of nervousness about their immediate neighbourhood. The widespread strategic anxiety within the Bulgarian mass public at the beginning of the 90's calmed down in the following years with the effect that we find only less than one third of Bulgarians (31 per cent), which are still anxious about the military intentions of their neighbouring states in 1996. The war in Yugoslavia, taking place just over the Bulgarian border, and its cessation may have affected these attitudes.

A very low level of military anxiety can be found in Poland (15 per cent), the Czech Republic (14 per cent), Belarus (11 per cent) and Ukraine (9 per cent). The stabilisation of the military thinking of the population is quite remarkable in Poland, where 63 per cent felt threatened by the Polish neighbours in 1992 - one could speak of high level of alertness on the brink of being alarmed. The relative strategic stabilisation in the Baltic countries, Belarus and Ukraine in the period between 1992 and 1996 perhaps had a calming effect on the Polish populace. A similar, but less dramatic development occurred in the Czech Republic. In 1992, 36 per cent of the Czech population were afraid of the Czech neighbours. That share decreased during the first half of the 90's to 14 per cent, which showed that the Czech mass public became more and more relaxed about the perceived military intentions of their neighbours. One interpretation of the high level of military confidence and a corresponding low level of military anxiety about neighbouring states in Belarus could be that the strategic closeness of Belarus to Russia produced a feeling of territorial security in that former Soviet Republic.

6. Internal threats: who is afraid of ethnic groups and minorities

If one analyses the perceived threat exerted by ethnic groups and minorities to internal stability and security across Eastern Europe, the first outcome is that ethnic tensions in that

region seem to have calmed down somewhat, at least in most of the countries. The average for all NDB-countries went down from 40 per cent feeling threatened in 1992 to 25 per cent under subjective threat in 1996, which leaves nevertheless one quarter of all Eastern Europeans, who think that internal security is threatened by ethnic minorities in their country (see Table 6).

The country with the highest level of ethnic tensions appears to be Slovakia. One half of the Slovakian population (48 per cent in 1996) has the impression that ethnic minorities pose a threat to peace and security in Slovakia. That share of Slovakians concerned about ethnic groups remained constant over time. The is perhaps the consequence of the on-going problems with the Hungarian minority of about 500 000 on the southern border who are seeking the use of their own language in the region in opposition to the policies of the Slovak government. The second highest level of subjective ethnic threat can be found in Croatia. In 1992 57 per cent of the Croatian population felt threatened by ethnic minorities, especially Serbs and other ethnic groups on the other side of the war. That percentage went down to 40 per cent in 1996, but must regarded still as quite high by comparison with other post-Communist societies. Croatia seems to be still a society at war, but the first signs of normalisation are visible. The subjective level of ethnic threat is also quite high in Bulgaria with the unsolved Turkish question and in Romania with strong Hungarian minorities in Western Romania. These are all countries with what might be termed 'dominant minorities'. Those countries whose populations contain 'dominant minorities' are the ones with the strongest perception of internal insecurity from this source.

Table 6

"Do you think, that ethnic groups and minorities within our country pose a threat (=big threat + some threat) to peace and security in this society?"

Threat from minorities and ethnic groups: 1992-1996



Slovenia is the only country, where the level of subjective ethnic distrust went up between 1992 and 1996 from 14 per cent to 20 per cent, albeit at a quite low general level. In the remaining countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Belarus, the Ukraine and Poland, the level of ethnic threats within societies from minorities towards the majorities, decreased considerably. In the Czech Republic we witness a fall from 44 per cent Czechs feeling threatened by Czech ethnic groups in 1992 to 15 per cent in 1996. Much of this is because of the separation from Slovakia, where the most of the ethnic minorities in the former Czechoslovakia were living. In Hungary, the downward tendency is not as steep as in the Czech Republic: 26 per cent of Hungarians felt threatened by ethnic groups in 1992, compared to only 15 per cent of the Hungarian population in 1996.

In Belarus and Ukraine the attitudinal pattern of anxieties about ethnic groups producing internal insecurity is again similar: In both countries 14 per cent feel threatened by ethnic minorities in 1996. In both post-Soviet countries the level of subjective ethnic tensions within the mass public fell considerably since 1992. An interesting outcome of that part of analysis is that Poland is the post-Communist country with the lowest levels of subjective ethnic insecurity in 1996. The anxiety of minorities endangering peace and stability of Polish society was with 37 per cent quite high in 1992. Since then, we seem to observe a definite cooling down of ethnic tensions in Poland. If this is a stable trend, we will be able to decide only by measuring the same phenomenon in future New Democracies Barometers.

7. Who is afraid of migrants and refugees?

An interesting question in the panorama of potential or real threats to Eastern European societies is the perception of migrants moving between different countries, especially between what we have described as the Central European buffer zone (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) and Western Europe on the one hand and between the buffer zone and Eastern Europe on the other hand. The threat by migrants was expressed by 36 per cent of all Eastern Europeans in 1992, but went down to 22 per cent in 1996. As in the case of ethnic minorities within post-Communist societies, the fear of migrants as a threat to the peace and security of the country decreased from one third to one fifth of the Eastern European mass public.

The highest level of concern about migrants and refugees can be found in Croatia with the special problem of war refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina escaping to Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Germany. The re-migration process from Germany and Austria has started, but puts necessarily additional demographic pressure upon Slovenia and Croatia. In 1992, 59 per cent of all Croatians felt threatened by migrants from other part of former Yugoslavia. This figure fell to 34 per cent in 1996, which is still the highest value all over Central and Eastern Europe. The second highest level of anxieties about migrants was found in Hungary, one of the main 'Buffer zone' countries. The perceived threat by migrants for Hungary went down from 51 per cent of the population concerned in 1992 to 33 per cent of the Hungarian public

in 1996. Hungary was also the country which received the most refugees from the former Yugoslavia of all countries outside of the former Yugoslavia itself (Fullerton, Sik and Toth 1995).

Table 7:
"Do you think, immigrants and refugees from other societies pose a threat (=big threat + some threat) or no threat to peace and security to this country?"



Slovakia is one of the only countries, together with Ukraine, where the anxiety about incoming migrants and refugees grew over time. In 1992, 23 per cent of the Slovakians felt threatened by migrants, this figure rose to 28 per cent in 1996, putting Slovakia on the third position in the scale of anxiety about migrants. This is surprising, since Slovakia receives relatively few migrants compared with her neighbours (Wallace, Chmouliar and Sidorenko, 1997), but may reflect the rising xenophobic rhetoric of the political leaders there. Originally, the aversion against migrants was much higher in their Czech Republic than in Slovakia, but anti-migrant feeling went down from 38 per cent in 1992 to 26 per cent in 1996, falling below the Slovakian level of anti-migrant feelings within the population. Slovenia was in 1992 in a completely different position due to the war and the massive flows of migrants and war refugees following the collapse of Yugoslavia. The substantial migration between Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and other former Republics of Yugoslavia produced in 1992 the result that 61 per cent of the Slovenian society felt threatened by migrants and refugees. This was a real and not an imagined danger within Slovenia, but also in Croatia.

In Belarus, the fear of migrants is well below the NDB-average and with one fifth of the Belorussian society constant over time. In 1996, 19 per cent of the Belorussian sample indicate that they feel threatened by migrants and refugees. In Poland we encounter again the process of 'normalisation': in 1992, 41 per cent of the Polish population was quite concerned about the migration pressure, whereas only 14 per cent of the Polish mass public was still nervous about migrants and refugees threatening peace and order in Polish society in 1996. In Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine we find similarly low levels of a perceived threat by migrants as in Poland with values around 13 per cent, whereas 90 per cent in those four countries are quite relaxed about migrants. One explanation for that outcome could be that these countries are the ones sending rather than receiving migrants.

Subjective Insecurity Index

Putting together all these sources of insecurity, we developed an index in order to measure how insecure in general each country was feeling[1]. The results are presented in Tables 8 and 9.

Table 8

Relative insecurity of different countries: combined index



The subjective threat index shows that Croatia is the most insecure country in terms of the anxieties of the population. Out of a maximum value of 60, Croatia scored 55, which means that it was the most subjectively insecure country in nearly all of the fields we have been

[1] The Index was constructed by assigning a score of 1 to those countries who ranked 10th in the list of countries on one dimension, a score of 2 to the country ranking 9th and so on so that those ranking first received a score of 10. There were 6 dimensions: Fear of neighbouring states; fear of internal minorities and ethnic groups; fear of refugees and migrants; fear of Germany, Russia and USA. The score for each country was then added together to give a measurement of how insecure each country felt overall. The maximum score was 60 and the minimum score 6.

discussing. On account of the war, the people of Croatia feel threatened from all directions - from neighbouring countries, from great powers, and from internal insecurity engendered by migrants and minorities.

Table 9:
Ranking of most threatened countries

	RANK-ORDER						
	Threat-Index	Russia	Neigh-bouring States	Internal minorities and ehtnic groups	External migrants and refugees	Germany	USA
Maximum value:	**60**						
1. Croatia	55	1	2	2	1	4	1
2. Slovakia	47	5	4	1	3	3	3
3. Czech Republic	38	3	8	6	4	2	5
4. Romania	32	4	5	4	9	6	6
5. Poland	31	2	7	10	7	1	8
6. Hungary	31	6	3	7	2	8	9
7. Slovenia	29	7	1	5	5	9	10
8. Belarus	27	9	9	8	6	5	2
9. Bulgaria	22	10	6	3	8	10	7
10. Ukraine	18	8	10	9	10	7	4
Maximum value:	**6**						

Basis=ranks in 6 fields of threat

The second most anxious country was Slovakia, which also rated highly on both internal and external security threats. The increasing political isolation of Slovakia from the other Central European countries (its exclusion from membership discussions for NATO and for the European Union, as well as repeated warnings from the Council of Europe and from the European Commission with regard to various positions taken by the Slovak government) perhaps creates or exacerbates this sense of threat. Furthermore, the xenophobic and often aggressive rhetoric of the political leaders of Slovakia may have had some effect in generating an insecure atmosphere.

The third most anxious country in terms of subjective insecurity was the Czech Republic. It is mainly the people's fear of great powers - Russia and Germany - which put the Czech Republic in this position.

Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia are all clustered together with between 32 and 29 points each. In the case of Romania, Poland and Slovenia, there have been significant reductions in anxiety about military threat or internal destabilisation in recent years.

The final cluster of countries are the former Soviet states of Ukraine and Belarus and the country most sympathetic to them - Bulgaria. What is surprising is that this group of countries which have perhaps the most to fear from internal and external insecurity (Bulgaria has a continuing unresolved problem with its Turkish and muslim minorities) and who appear to be the most fragile and most recently constructed democracies are in fact the least worried about military insecurity. These are the least well established democracies but also the least fearful.

Attitudes toward joining NATO

The feeling of insecurity may lead some post-Communist countries towards a desire to join NATO in order to secure their military position as part of a greater alliance. The fear of Russia may also make joining NATO a desirable objective.

In general a very high percentage of the population of post-Communist East-Central Europe wished to join NATO. On average 64% - nearly two thirds - of all the people combined saw joining NATO as beneficial. This rose to 90% in Romania and 86% in Slovenia and Poland. Croatia followed with three quarters of her population - 76% - having this opinion. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were clustered together with around two thirds in favour of joining NATO.

Table 10:
Statement: "Becoming a member of NATO would be beneficial"



We can see that in general those countries who felt the least subjective insecurity - Ukraine, Bulgaria and Belarus - were also the ones least likely to want to join NATO. Belarus was the only country with a marjority - who thirds (69%) - against joining NATO. Nevertheless, one third of Bulgarians and Belarussians and more than one half of Ukrainians expressed a desire to join NATO. Whilst in all countries opinions were polarised between those who were for joining NATO and those who were against, in Bulgaria there was a very high number of 'Don't Knows' - 39%. Perhaps this reflects the uncertainty in Bulgaria as to whether the country should be westwards or eastwards looking in its strategic alliances.

These results are corroborated by those of the United States Information Agency (USIA) which carries out regular surveys on security issues in these countries (USIA,1997). Of people who said that they strongly favour or favour becoming a full member of NATO, they found Romanians (79%) were among the highest scorers followed by Slovenia with 71% and Poland with 72%. Next came Hungary (57%), Bulgaria (52%) Czech Republic (51%) and Slovakia (46%). This survey was also carried out in 1996 but did not include the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine and Belarus. They conclude that support for joining NATO is shallow and has declined since 1995. However, we would disagree wwith this conclusion. It seems to us that support is not shallow - it is very high and continues to be high despite some decline since 1995. More than half of most of the countries questioned wanted to become full members of NATO. However, USIA found that even if Central and Eastern European countries are keen to join NATO, they are not keen to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership including routine exercises in their country, having NATO troops stationed in their country, having regular overflights from NATO aircraft or sending troops to support another NATO ally. Furthermore, the large majority in each country favour social over military spending.

Ironically those countries who most desired to join NATO - Slovenia and Romania - are not the countries which have been accepted to the alliance. Although Bulgaria is to a great extent eastwards looking or ambivalent about its directions, neighbouring Romania is emphatically westwards looking. This is borne out in other indicators of economic and political orientation as well (Wallace 1997). Hungary and the Czech Republic, who have been accepted to the alliance, are not as enthusiastic about it as some of the other countries, falling below the mean for the whole group. The people of Poland on the other hand should feel pleased that they have been allowed to join - they are also very enthusiastic about it.

What is the patterning of attitudes about security?

Our next task was to try to understand how differernt forms of feelings of insecurity are associated together. Are the same people worried about migrants and minorities as are worried about threats from surrounding countries or great powers? Or are these sources of insecurity actually quite different in the minds of the people of Eastern Europe? Another set of issues is how this sense of military insecurity may or may not be associated with economic insecurity. The rapid changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe have threatened the livelihood of many people which could have lead to some xenophobic reactions.

For this we carried out a factor analysis which cross correlated different sources of threat and some other important variables such as economic security and demographic variables: sex and education. We found three main patterns of threat: those who found everything threatening, those who saw only the "great powers" of America, Russia, Germany or neighbouring countries as a threat and those who saw Russia as the main threat. The latter group were sub-divided between who were well off and those who felt economically threatened in various ways. Altogether, this patterning explained 58.3% of the variance.

The first group were those threatened by everything. This group explained 15.8% of the variance. They score highly on each variable in or list of threats. However, on other indicators they did not score very highly. They were slightly more likely to be better educated but to have fewer consumer goods. We can say that this is a group of people who are anxious about all sources of military and security threat but they are not economically threatened. This general internal and external insecurity is not associated very much with anything else and this corresponds with findings in another analysis of this same survey looking in more detail at threat by migrants and minorities. A very anxious group existed, but their anxiety correlated only with other anxieties and not with socio-economic or demographic factors (Haerpfer and Wallace 1997). We could say that they were simply a very insecure group.

The second group were those who saw only the great powers - Germany, Russia and USA as threatening but not minority ethnic groups or migrants. They perceived threat only in terms of external insecurity. This group were not strongly associated with any particular socio-economic or demographic characteristics either.

The third group were those who felt threatened strongly only by Russia. Those who felt that Russia was a threat to the peace and security of their country were negatively associated with feeling threat from the USA - that is, the more they felt threatened by Russia, the more they felt friendly towards the USA: Nor were they threatened by sources of internal insecurity - migrants and minority groups. However, they were quite likely to be men, lower educated. They were also very likely to feel economically threatened, having had to borrow money in the last year, experienced unemployment and to find the situation of their family today

Table 9:
Factor Analysis of threat

	Everything is threatening	Great Powers are threatening	Russia is threatening and economically threatened	Russia is threatening and economically threatened	Russia is threatening and NOT economically threatened
Threat by Russia	.310	.559	.185	.146	.250
Threat by Germany	.091	.888	.034	-.060	.047
Threat by USA	.130	.819	-.099	-.050	-.189
Threat by neighbouring countries	.705	.239	.058	.101	.091
Threat by ethnic and minority groups	.834	.074	-.003	.017	-.067
Threat by immigrants and refugees	.751	.072	-.023	-.068	-.034
Sex: Male-female	.031	-.031	.170	.717	-.001
Education low-high	.167	-.078	-.267	-.284	.424
Consumer goods index low-high	-.107	.031	.009	.068	.883
Experience of unemployment Yes-No	.026	-.006	-.323	.599	-.012
Enough money from regular job Yes- No	-.060	-.016	.772	.056	-.018
Saved-Borrowed money	.009	-.010	.652	-.188	-.077
Satisfactory-Unsatisfactory situation of family today	.044	.043	.806	.004	-.145
Variance explained	**15.8%**	**9%**	**18.4%**	**7.4%**	**7.8%**

Variance explained overall: 58.3%

unsatisfactory. This group explained the highest amount of the variance- 18.4%. The second sub group of people who felt threatened by Russia were also male, also low educated but did not show quite so strongly on the economically threatened indicators - for example they had

been able to save rather than borrow money in the last year. The final group of those who felt threatened by Russia were not economically threatened at all - indeed they were rather economically secure. They were highly educated, had many consumer goods, had managed to save money in the last year and were satisfied with the economic situation. These were more affluent groups who nevertheless saw Russia as a threat. This explained 7.8% of the variance.

We could conclude therefore that in terms of the patterning of attitudes, one group were highly anxious and that for them all sources of threat - internal and external - were associated. The second group perceived only external but not internal threats. The third group were afraid of Russia but they fell into two distinct sub-groups. On the one hand there were un or lower educated men who were economically insecure who were likely to see Russia as a threat. On the other hand there was a group of educated and affluent people who also saw Russia as a threat. Seeing Russia as a threat is therefore associated for some with economic insecurity. However, threat of migrants and minorities was not (Haerpfer and Wallace 1997).

Conclusions

In general we can see that in the Post-Communist Central European countries the sense of threat from internal problems - migrants and ethnic minorities has generally gone down since 1996. The same goes for feelings of threat from neighbouring states. The exceptions to this rule would be the countries affected by the recent war among the states that make up the former-Yugoslavia. However, a sense of threat from great powers has increased, most notably threat by Russia and Germany, followed by the USA.

What is also noticeable is that the region divides into distinct blocks. The former Soviet states have far less fear and anxiety than do the buffer zone states of Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics. High anxiety can also be found amongst Romanians and Slovenians. These are the countries most eager to join the European Union and NATO. They are also the countries which have 'westernised' most in their economic and political reforms. They presumably feel themselves to be part of a western block.

By contrast, Belarus, Ukraine and Bulgaria feel themselves to be more part of an Eastern block of countries.

Croatia is in rather an untypical situation being a recent participant in war and people in Croatia are the most insecure in the region, although this insecurity has declined somewhat sinde 1992.

Those feeling threatened can be subdivided into distinct groups. Firstly there are those who feel threatened by both internal and external factors, but their anxiety is not associated with anything else except anxiety. They are a very insecure group. The second group see only external powers or countries as a threat to peace and security. The third group see only Russia as being the problem and these were divided between lower educated men who were also economically insecure and higher educated people who were economically secure. Economic insecurity does not therefore directly lead to any sense of insecurity or security except in the case of a group of men who are likely to have been unemployed and who are most likely to be unsatisfied with their economic situation. On the basis of these results, we could not say that economic insecurity leads to a xenophobic reaction -there was no association with migrants and minorities. However it does lead to a fear of Russia in the minds of some men.

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